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REVIEW ESSAY 
BREAKING THE SILENCE: LAW, THEOLOGY AND 
RELIGION IN AUSTRALIA 
PAUL BABIE∗ 
‘Theology and Law: Partners or Protagonists?’ edited by Christine 
Parker and Gordon Preece, 8(1) Interface: A Forum for Theology in 
the World (Adelaide: ATF Press, 2005) pages i–ii, 1–125. Price 
A$19.95 (softcover). ISBN 1929691 46 4. 
[The collection of essays found in Theology and Law: Partners or Protagonists? makes a valuable 
contribution to the exploration of the relationship between law and religion. Still, there is a flaw with 
the volume: it fails to define and distinguish ‘theology’ and ‘religion’. Drawing a distinction between 
the two terms has methodological implications. This review essay offers a means of distinguishing 
the two terms, from which two methodological approaches flow: ‘law and religion’ and ‘theology 
and law’. A volume devoted solely to the latter would make a significant and unique contribution to 
existing Australian legal literature, while one devoted to the former would merely add to a relatively 
well-established body of research. While this review essay argues that the volume is directed more to 
law and religion than theology and law, it also concludes that the volume is significant and 
important because it opens a sustained and focused dialogue between religion (which includes 
theology) and law.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
Is there a relationship between theology and law? If so, is there any relevance 
in exploring this relationship? And can the endeavour to find possible parallels, 
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overlaps or intersections bear fruit? The paucity of Australian legal literature in 
this area suggests a negative response to each of these questions. In introducing 
the collection of essays in Theology and Law: Partners or Protagonists?,1 
Gordon Preece suggests that this may be a consequence of the fact that theology 
and law are ‘two of the currently least popular and least esteemed disciplines and 
professions in western societies.’2 Nevertheless, because ‘these are two institu-
tions at the very heart of our society, whose individual health and healthy 
relationship society has a vested interest to maintain’, Theology and Law 
‘explores that relationship with a view to renewing the health of both’.3 This is 
an important goal, for while the two disciplines may arguably be lacking in 
public esteem, and there may exist a gap in the Australian legal literature on the 
relationship between them, it does not mean that engaging with them bears little 
fruit or is irrelevant to a full understanding of Australian society. 
 The rich and diverse American legal literature reveals a number of possible 
dimensions to society’s relationship with both theology and law.4 Some scholars 
consider the ways in which law exhibits theological dimensions, the ways in 
which law is a dimension of theology, and the fact that theology played a role in, 
and influenced the development, application and operation of, ‘secular’5 
domestic civil law.6 Each of the three monotheistic traditions — Judaism,7 
Christianity8 and Islam9 — are represented in this enterprise. Others study 
religious law, itself based upon theological conclusions, as an inherently interest-
ing and important field in its own right.10 Still others note the necessity of 
 
 1 Christine Parker and Gordon Preece (eds), Theology and Law: Partners or Protagonists? (2005) 
(‘Theology and Law’). 
 2 Gordon Preece, ‘Editorial’ in Christine Parker and Gordon Preece (eds), Theology and Law: 
Partners or Protagonists? (2005) 1, 1. 
 3 Ibid. 
 4 The seminal works in this area, and those which masterfully summarise the historical evidence 
of this relationship, are those of Harold J Berman: see, eg, Harold J Berman, The Interaction of 
Law and Religion (1974); Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western 
Legal Tradition (1983); Harold J Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and 
Religion (1993). See also the stimulating collection of essays found in J Rowland Pennock and 
John W Chapman (eds), Religion, Morality, and the Law (1988). 
 5 See Berman, Law and Revolution, above n 4, ch 8. 
 6 Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, above n 1, chs 1, 3; Berman, Law and Revolution, 
above n 4, pt II; Berman, Faith and Order, above n 4. 
 7 See N S Hecht et al (eds), An Introduction to the History and Sources of Jewish Law (1996); 
Alan M Dershowitz, The Genesis of Justice: Ten Stories of Biblical Injustice that Led to the Ten 
Commandments and Modern Morality and Law (2000). 
 8 See Robert E Rodes Jr, Pilgrim Law (1998); Mary Jo Bane and Lawrence M Mead, Lifting Up 
the Poor: A Dialogue on Religion, Poverty and Welfare Reform (2003); Robert F Drinan, Can 
God and Caesar Coexist: Balancing Religious Freedom and International Law (2004). 
 9 See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (2001); 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (2004); Ron Greaves, Aspects of 
Islam (2005); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity (2004); 
Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qu’ran to Bin Laden (2005). 
 10 In relation to Judaic law: see, eg, Donna Litman, ‘Jewish Law: Deciphering the Code by Global 
Process and Analogy’ (2005) 82 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 563. In relation to 
Christian law: see, eg, ZENIT, ‘Michael Scaperlanda on a Person-Centered System’ (Press 
Release, 13 February 2005). Michael Scaperlanda is a Professor of Law at The University of 
Oklahoma College of Law. In relation to Shari’a law: see, eg, Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s 
Name, above n 9; Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, above n 9; Jamila 
Hussain, Islam: Its Law and Society (2004); Asaf A Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (4th 
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understanding the history of a theological tradition in order to comprehend the 
contemporary operation of a modern legal system.11 
The search for historical connections and influences in the development of 
modern law has been particularly illuminating in the case of Christianity.12 The 
earliest courts in England, for instance, were not the courts of common law but 
the ecclesiastical courts. By the 12th century, when judicial process was only just 
beginning in the English secular courts, ecclesiastical courts had already long 
looked very much like what we would call a court today: a judge trying to find 
out what had happened between the parties, comparing evidence given by 
witnesses, and applying rules that could be looked up in books.13 Harold J 
Berman, in his monumental study Law and Revolution: The Formation of the 
Western Legal Tradition, writes that: 
basic institutions, concepts, and values of Western legal systems have their 
sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, reflecting new attitudes toward death, sin, punishment, forgiveness, 
and salvation, as well as new assumptions concerning the relationship of the 
divine to the human and of faith to reason. Over the intervening centuries, these 
religious attitudes and assumptions have changed fundamentally, and today 
their theological sources seem to be in the process of drying up. Yet the legal 
institutions, conceptions, and values that have derived from them still survive, 
often unchanged. Western legal science is a secular theology, which often 
makes no sense because its theological presuppositions are no longer ac-
cepted.14 
In other words, the history of the Western legal tradition, of the common law 
itself, is intimately bound up with Christian theology.15 Recent American 
scholarship builds upon this conclusion, elucidating the extent to which the 
United States Constitution was strongly influenced by the Christian faith of its 
authors.16 It was S F C Milsom who famously argued that it is only ‘[o]ur own 
 
ed, 1974); Lawrence Rosen, The Justice of Islam (2000); Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, ‘What Is 
Islamic Law?’ (2006) 57 Mercer Law Review 595; Anver Emon, ‘Understanding Sharia Law: 
Further Education about Islamic History and Islamic Law Necessary’, The Bulletin (University 
of Toronto), 31 October 2005, 20. 
 11 Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, above n 4, ch 2; Berman, Law and Revolution, 
above n 4, ‘Introduction’, ‘Conclusion’; Berman, Faith and Order, above n 4. 
 12 See especially Berman, Law and Revolution, above n 4; Berman, Faith and Order, above n 4; 
Francis E Peters, The Monotheists: Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Conflict and Competition 
(2003) vols 1–2; F E Peters, The Children of Abraham: Judaism, Christianity, Islam: A New 
Edition (2004). 
 13 S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2nd ed, 1981) 25. See also at 87–8. 
 14 Berman, Law and Revolution, above n 4, 165. 
 15 Ibid 33–45; Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, above n 4, ch 2; Berman, Faith and 
Order, above n 4, 23–238.  
 16 See, eg, Sydney E Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (2nd ed, 2004) ch 23. 
See especially James H Hutson (ed), The Founders on Religion: A Book of Quotations (2005) 
76–8, which deals with the United States Constitution. Still, this remains a point of controversy 
and debate: see Frank Lambert, The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America 
(2003); David L Holmes, The Faiths of the Founding Fathers (2006). For a more popular ac-
count: see Jon Meacham, American Gospel (2006). 
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age … which has felt able to relegate the relationship between law and morals to 
the class-room.’17 
The Australian legal academy seems to have forgotten — and perhaps over-
looks, in favour of a more secular account — the historical relationship between 
theology and law.18 This results in a more serious contemporary omission: a 
failure of the two disciplines to speak to, and learn from, one another.19 While 
there may be reasons for this, such as the comparatively recent rejection of 
natural law as having anything useful to say in the modern legal academy,20 it is 
nonetheless disappointing. Writing in the American context about property, 
Harvard law Professor Joseph William Singer explains that by studying theology 
we can learn from centuries of study and debate about the appropriate role of 
morality in the economic world. Major religions have grappled with the ques-
tion of what obligations a good person has in the world of commerce, and have 
suggested ways to make an economic system compatible with the full range of 
our values. By looking at religious traditions, we may deepen our engagement 
with those values and find some inspiration on how to negotiate tensions we 
face between the pursuit of profit and the pursuit of humanity.21 
The interdisciplinary study of theology and law seeks to determine the ways in 
which both may actually be pursuing the same goal — morality and justice — 
and how, in that common pursuit, they might offer insights to one another.22 
The novelty of Theology and Law, therefore, lies in its contribution to Austra-
lian legal literature. Australia’s theologians — indeed, those of most countries — 
have long recognised the interplay between the two disciplines, and they 
continue to grapple with the impact of theological understanding and religious 
conviction upon law, law-making, and legal processes.23 Those in the law 
schools, however, remain in need of rediscovering the theological background to 
Anglo-Australian law and a fuller understanding of the world in which we live. 
 
 17 Milsom, above n 13, 25. Yet, while there are legal ethics subjects in contemporary Australian 
law schools, very few teach law and religion, unlike so many of their American and Canadian 
counterparts. 
 18 For instance, the authoritative legal history of Australia: Alex C Castles, An Australian Legal 
History (1982), makes no explicit reference to the established role played by Christianity in the 
development of the English common law. As such, the Christian heritage, through the English 
common law, of Australia’s law and legal structure is wiped away in favour of a more secular 
account. 
 19 This problem has been identified in Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, above n 4, 
ch 2. See generally Berman, Law and Revolution, above n 4. 
 20 See generally M D A Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (7th ed, 2001) 120–3. 
However, there are some significant recent works which argue persuasively that natural law still 
has something to contribute to contemporary jurisprudence: see, eg, Germain Grisez and Russell 
B Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom (1980); John Finnis, Natu-
ral Law and Natural Rights (9th imp, 1997); Robert P George, In Defence of Natural Law (2001). 
 21 Joseph William Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on the Obligations of Ownership (2000) 
41–2. See also Pennock and Chapman, above n 4. 
 22 See Dershowitz, above n 7; Berman, Law and Revolution, above n 4, 33–45; Singer, above n 21, 
41–2; Berman, Faith and Order, above n 4. 
 23 Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, above n 4, ch 2. In Australia, this is demonstrated 
by events such as the Bonhoeffer Conference, hosted by Whitley College, the Baptist Theologi-
cal College of Victoria, The University of Melbourne, 21–24 September 2006, which dealt in 
part with what Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a World War II-era German dissident theologian, would say 
to modern Australians in light of legal and political developments over the last decade.  
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The collection of essays applies existing theories to early and contemporary 
manifestations of the interplay between theology and law in Australia. The 
essays found in Theology and Law — written by antipodean academic lawyers 
and theologians24 — open a much-needed dialogue between theology and law in 
relation to both the historical antecedents of the Western legal tradition, and the 
deeper relationship, as concerns morality and justice, between them. This allows 
each to learn from the other. And while it may add little to the American litera-
ture on the topic, it makes a unique contribution to Australian legal literature. 
Still, as this review essay will show, one weakness emerges. 
This review essay is divided into six parts. Part II identifies the weakness with 
Theology and Law — its failure to define and distinguish ‘theology’ and 
‘religion’ — and also provides a means of distinguishing the two. Part III 
outlines two methodological approaches which flow from the distinction 
between theology and religion. Using the two approaches set out in Part III, 
Parts IV–V reorganise the essays found in the volume on the basis of whether 
they deal with the relationship between religion and law, or theology and law. 
Part V offers some concluding reflections on the study of the relationship 
between theology and law. 
II   THE NEED TO DEFINE AND DISTINGUISH ‘THEOLOGY’ AND 
‘RELIGION’ 
Notwithstanding the great value of Theology and Law in opening dialogue and 
exploring the relationship between theology and law, there is a weakness: the 
failure to define and distinguish ‘theology’ and ‘religion’. While these terms are 
obviously related, they are not the same. This may seem a minor point, yet in 
fact it makes all the difference; as we will see it has implications for the meth-
odological approach one adopts. 
There are many ways in which one might have approached the task of defining 
and distinguishing theology and religion — a vast literature covers this area, and 
no claim is made here to be comprehensive.25 In offering a means of defining 
and distinguishing the two terms, the intent is not to criticise what is done in Law 
and Theology, but to strengthen its impact. We must, then, begin with defini-
tions. 
For the purposes of this essay, ‘theology’ can be taken to mean, literally, ‘god 
discourse’. It involves reflection on the existence of god(s), the nature or being 
of god(s), and the relationships that exist between god(s) and humanity and 
 
 24 The academic lawyers are Associate Professor Adrian Evans, Faculty of Law, Monash 
University; Garth Blake SC, practising barrister in Sydney; Professor Fr Frank Brennan SJ AO, 
School of Law, The University of Notre Dame Australia and Institute of Legal Studies, Austra-
lian Catholic University; Dr Nicky Jones; Reid Mortensen, Reader in Law, TC Beirne School of 
Law, University of Queensland; Dr Christine Parker, Australian Research Council (‘ARC’) 
Research Fellow, Faculty of Law, The University of Melbourne. The theologians are Dr Christo-
pher D Marshall and Rev Dr Gordon Preece.  
 25 T Jeremy Gunn, ‘The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International 
Law’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 189, 193–5. 
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between humans.26 Theology begins from the baseline assumption of the 
existence of, and human faith in, god(s), and then attempts to understand that 
faith.27 The origins of this concept of theology as ‘faith seeking understanding’ 
can be traced back to Saint Augustine’s famous exhortation to both ‘understand, 
in order to believe’ and ‘believe, in order to understand.’28 The word ‘god(s)’ 
captures the use of theology to describe the process of enquiry in relation to 
either monotheistic traditions (belief in one god) or polytheistic traditions (belief 
in more than one god). This is not an uncontroversial approach to theology. One 
must be sensitive to the fact that, as a discipline, theology is typically associated 
with Christianity — a monotheistic faith. As such, non-Christians, especially 
those who adhere to polytheistic traditions, sometimes consider ‘theology’ to be 
pejorative and imperialistic when used in relation to their traditions. 
As with theology, many have attempted to define ‘religion’, but with little 
agreement.29 Some offer tentative definitions while others refer to ‘facets’. John 
Bowker, for instance, takes the former approach, emphasising that religions are 
organised systems which hold people together.30 The origins of, and reasons for, 
this systematisation lie in the fundamental condition of human life and survival, 
which in turn lies in the human biogenetic structuralism that prepares humans, in 
a gene/protein sense, for those characteristic behaviours which we might call 
‘religious’.31 This preparedness and its role in human survival in turn give rise to 
somatic exploration and discovery. It might be said that survival and biological 
preparedness are what give rise to theology — the somatic search for an under-
standing of faith. Finally, once all of this occurs, various forms of organisation 
may arise: large-scale, coherently organised and hierarchical, as is the case with 
Roman Catholicism; large-scale and loosely organised, with virtually no 
structure at all, such as Hinduism; or small-scale and local, of which there are a 
great variety of examples. Countless variations on these three ideal-types can be 
found. But the unifying theme is that the organisational structure which defines 
religion grows around theology. And whatever its level and degree of organisa-
tion, a religion typically views itself as being metaphysical — not an end in itself 
but a means to an end — based upon a theology built upon particular texts, 
traditions, and stories, which are themselves based upon core myths, rituals, and 
symbols.32 
In lieu of a definition, T Jeremy Gunn offers three central ‘facets’ of religion. 
The first, belief, refers to the convictions that people hold regarding such matters 
as god(s), truth, or doctrines of faith. Secondly, and in contrast to belief, identity 
emphasises affiliation with a group — religion is experienced as something akin 
 
 26 See the definition of ‘theology’ given in John Bowker (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of World 
Religions (1997) 970.  
 27 Ibid. 
 28 St Augustine, ‘Sermon 43 — On What Is Written in Isaiah: Unless You Believe, You Shall Not 
Understand’ in John Rotelle (ed), The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Cen-
tury: Sermons (Edmund Hill trans, 1990 ed) vol 2, 238, 241–3. 
 29 See, eg, Gunn, above n 25, 193–9; Willard G Oxtoby (ed), World Religions: Western Traditions 
(2nd ed, 2001); Willard G Oxtoby (ed), World Religions: Eastern Traditions (2nd ed, 2001). 
 30 Bowker, above n 26, xv–xxiv. 
 31 Ibid xvii.  
 32 Ibid xv–xxiv. 
     
302 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 31 
     
to family, ethnicity, race or nationality. Finally, and analytically distinct from 
belief and identity, but tied to one of them in the mind of the religious person, is 
way of life — religion is associated with actions, rituals, customs and traditions 
that may distinguish the believer from adherents of other religions.33 
Defining theology and religion allows us to distinguish between them, and so 
explain their relationship to one another. Based on the definitions used in this 
essay, we can say that theology captures the attempt to explain and explore the 
existence of god(s), our relationship to god(s) and its impact on our relationship 
with one another, while religion describes the institution that grows up around, 
and which is based upon, a particular theology. The important point here is that 
religion is an organisational structure by which one gains identity and a way of 
life, founded upon a metaphysical (that is, theological) assumption or set of 
assumptions about god(s). Thus, religion as an institution may be broadly 
understood, as in the case of the Christian church, or narrowly understood, as in 
the case of the Orthodox Church, which is a denomination within the Christian 
church. But in either case, theology is the core of the religion — both Christian-
ity and Orthodoxy are institutions founded upon a particular theology. 
An example assists: consider religious law — a legal system based upon the 
theological assumptions that underlie a particular faith. The system of laws is a 
structure established by humans founded upon the theological assumptions that 
form the core of that religious tradition. The system of laws is part of the 
religion, while the underlying theological assumptions are its core. Islamic or 
Judaic law are examples of this. Or, to take a recent and controversial issue, 
consider the Christian debate over intelligent design. Assuming that intelligent 
design is correct, theology would ask what that might tell us about the Christian 
understanding of God and God’s relationship to humanity. Christianity, whether 
Catholic, Orthodox, evangelical, or any other confessional group falling under 
that banner, might issue dogmatic teachings about how the conclusion of 
intelligent design structures the lives of those who make up the institution. 
Why is this distinction important? Simply because deciding whether one is 
dealing with theology or religion has methodological implications for a project 
such as Theology and Law. If this volume seeks to address the eponymous 
question whether religion and law are partners or protagonists, then we might 
anticipate that it would, of necessity, consider whether religion as an institution 
is a partner or a protagonist of law as an institution (a legal system). And because 
religion encompasses theology, such a volume could also have covered both 
religion and theology, and its relationship to law, either as an institution or in a 
theoretical sense. In other words, it may have included theoretical questions, 
such as the relationship between a particular theological assumption in a 
specified religion, and a legal system or theory of law. 
If, however, as its title suggests, the volume is only aimed at theology and law, 
then it presumably seeks answers to questions about the relationship between the 
theory of law — jurisprudence, or what law is and how it structures relationships 
between people — and theories about the existence of, and faith in, god(s), and 
 
 33 Gunn, above n 25, 204–5. 
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our relationship with god(s) and one another. The next Part outlines the two 
methodological approaches that follow from such a distinction. 
I I I   TWO METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
Preece outlines five possible approaches to the question of whether ‘theology 
and law’ are ‘protagonists or partners’: 
1 The first approach attempts a synthesis of the two disciplines at a highly 
theoretical level.34 
2 The second approach involves the search for essential themes which find 
resonance with the other discipline at a less theoretical and technical level 
than the first approach.35 
3 The third approach seeks integration of the two disciplines — scholars 
who take this approach may view the two disciplines as being at war, as 
running parallel, or as being intimately engaged. Alternatively, they may 
argue that theology, being ‘the queen of all sciences’36 is paramount to law, 
or that it transforms other disciplines such as law.37 
4 The fourth approach ‘examine[s] a range of contentious issues where law 
adjudicates the contested boundary between an allegedly secular society 
and public religion’.38 
5 The fifth approach asks questions about the ‘character formation of pro-
fessionals’ in the light of theological and experiential narratives which sus-
tain Christian and ethical character.39 
This Part argues that it is possible to consolidate Preece’s five approaches into 
two, both of which more closely correspond to the relationship between theology 
and religion outlined in Part II, and therefore, more accurately reflect the 
existing methodological approach found in the legal literature. 
The first approach, which we can call ‘theology and law’ or simply ‘engage-
ment’, comprises Preece’s first, second, third and fifth approaches. Remember 
that theology is discourse about god(s). Thus, if we seek answers to whether 
theology and law are protagonists or partners, we are really seeking answers to 
whether theology and law engage at the theoretical level. By calling such 
approaches ‘theology and law’ or ‘engagement’, we describe efforts to engage 
the two disciplines on their own terms — and sometimes to synthesise or 
integrate their positions — in a search for common objectives, pursuits or themes 
(typically, morality or justice). At a general level, such approaches might 
 
 34 Preece, above n 2, 1. 
 35 Ibid. This is not an unknown approach in the American literature: see, eg, Singer, above n 21. 
 36 Preece, above n 2, 2. See also John Polkinghorne, Serious Talk: Science and Religion in 
Dialogue (1995) 58–9. 
 37 Preece, above n 2, 2. This approach is known to the American academy through the integrative 
jurisprudence of scholars like Berman, Faith and Order, above n 4, 289–312. 
 38 Preece, above n 2, 3 (emphasis added). 
 39 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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consider, by way of a comparative approach, how theology and law, for their 
own reasons, are sourced in, related to, and constitutive of, the relationships that 
structure the world in which we live. More specifically, a theology and law 
approach might examine and analyse the positions taken by the two disciplines 
on any particular social or moral topic, and ask whether they seek the same or 
divergent goals. Thus, the theology and law approach seeks some level of 
engagement at the ontological level, allowing the two disciplines to speak for 
themselves as to the world in which we live — what it was, what it is, and what 
it might or ought to be. It is only at this ontological level that one can truly 
decide whether, in contributing to and constituting the structure of the world in 
which we live, theology and law act at cross-purposes or in concert. Aside from 
studies of Islamic law40 — when they deal with the relationship between the 
underlying theology of Islamic faith and the system of laws which is based upon 
those assumptions — this approach is little represented in the Australian legal 
literature. 
The second approach, which we can call ‘law and religion’, is captured by 
Preece’s fourth and fifth approaches.41 We know that a religion is an institution 
founded upon or growing around theology or theological assumptions or 
conclusions about god(s). If then, one is investigating the relationship between 
religion and law, one is exploring the relationship between religion as an 
institution, and a legal system. To the extent that it considers theology at all, the 
law and religion approach typically considers the legal issues and arguments 
surrounding the separation of Church and state or the protection of religious 
freedom in a given state or group of states. This approach is well-established in 
both Australian jurisprudence42 and legal literature.43 
As useful as a law and religion approach may be to understanding governmen-
tal structure and the role of religion in public life, aside from those scholars who 
examine religious law, it fails to examine questions concerning the relationship 
between theology and law. Why? Simply because of its implicit assumption: that 
law controls, regulates, and sometimes protects religion, either by securing 
religious freedom, or determining how much or how little religion should play a 
role in, or influence, public life. In contrast to the theology and law approach, the 
question is answered before one even begins: law and religion are neither 
protagonists, in the sense of being leading players in a drama or story, nor 
 
 40 See, eg, Timothy Lindsey (ed), Indonesia: Law and Society (1998); Hussain, above n 10. 
 41 Preece’s fifth approach falls into both theology and law, and law and religion, because it is 
possible that in some cases, ethics may be founded upon theological assumptions, while in 
others they may draw upon the dogmatic teachings of a particular religion. 
 42 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, in which 
the High Court of Australia dealt with the meaning of religion for the purposes of taxation laws. 
 43 See, eg, Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson and Rosalind F Croucher (eds), Law and Religion 
(2005); Tom Frame, Church and State: Australia’s Imaginary Wall (2007); Frank Brennan, 
Acting on Conscience: How Can We Responsibly Mix Law, Religion and Politics? (2006); Caro-
lyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (2001); Mark 
Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (1999); Carolyn Evans, ‘Chinese 
Law and the International Protection of Religious Freedom’ (2002) 44 Journal of Church and 
State 749. This was aptly demonstrated at the Law, Religion and Social Change Conference 
hosted by the ANU College of Law, The Australian National University, Canberra, 25–27 May 
2006. 
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partners. According to this analysis, law acts as a wall separating religion from 
public civic life. The wall may be higher or lower, thus keeping more or less of 
religion out of public life — but as a wall, it cannot cross into the domain of 
religion, and certainly never into that of theology. 
Of course, a law and religion approach accepts that religious traditions are 
founded on theological positions or assumptions; indeed that is the point of the 
analysis — law either keeps those assumptions out of public life, or it allows 
them in to a limited extent. But law never penetrates the surface of the religious 
tradition, whatever it happens to be, to comment upon the underlying theological 
assumptions themselves. To do that would violate the very premise of the 
exercise — that Church and state are separate and that the latter merely provides, 
through law, a wall against such encroachments occurring in either direction. 
This approach then, is little interested in the underlying theology of any particu-
lar religious tradition, and what it might have to say about the law and its 
operation in the world in which we live or vice versa. Rather, while it might 
consider what religion has to say about a particular moral or social problem in 
the course of determining separation or protection issues, it avoids exploring the 
underlying theology behind that religious-institutional position, and concerns 
itself only with the relationship between adherents to a particular religious 
tradition and the state in which they live. Clearly, law and religion analysis has 
value in developing the law controlling the separation of Church and state, and in 
protecting religious freedom; but it has limited utility in seeking answers to any 
deeper ontological relationship between theology and law. Law and religion 
analysis falls more comfortably within doctrinal categories of law such as 
constitutional law, civil rights law, or international human rights law. 
The foregoing has implications for how we interpret Theology and Law. If the 
volume is about theology, then we might hope that it offers answers to the ways 
in which law and theology view relationships between individuals and how those 
relationships structure, and are structured by, the society in which we live. If, 
however, the volume is about religion, then it would fall into the well-established 
law and religion category and add to doctrinal categories like constitutional law 
or civil rights law. Both lines of enquiry are clearly useful, but the former would 
offer something quite novel and forge a new path within the contemporary 
Australian legal academy, while the latter would merely add to an existing body 
of literature and walk a comparatively well-worn track. 
What then, does Theology and Law offer? Reorganising its contributions 
according to the two methodologies set out in this Part shows that it offers more 
of a law and religion analysis than a theology and law analysis. 
IV  LAW AND RELIGION 
Four of the essays in Theology and Law employ a law and religion methodol-
ogy. In the first, Garth Blake reports on the response of the Anglican Church in 
Australia to the sexual abuse of children and adults by the clergy and Church 
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workers who had pastoral responsibility for them.44 Having canvassed the 
‘catalogue of failures’ of the Anglican Church — criminal convictions, civil 
litigation, inquiries, Church discipline and resignations — Blake outlines the 
initial responses of the Church: the establishment of a child protection commit-
tee; a sexual abuse working group; and a national abuse protocol working 
group.45 The essay concludes with the resolutions passed and the canons 
promulgated by the General Synod of the Anglican Church in October 2004. 
One also finds law and religion approaches in the contributions of Reid 
Mortensen,46 Nicky Jones47 and Frank Brennan.48 Mortensen’s essay examines 
what is termed the ‘soft’ approach to the separation of Church and state in 
Australia, Jones considers the Islamic headscarf controversy in France, and 
Brennan explores the same-sex marriage debate in Australia. Because all three 
address the same underlying issue — the separation of Church and state — this 
essay considers only the contributions of Mortensen and Brennan, which involve 
matters relevant to Australia. 
Mortensen argues that notwithstanding appeals to the contrary, in the Austra-
lian polity, integration as opposed to separation of churches (religions) and state 
is the norm. Integration finds expression in ‘an anti-discrimination principle by 
which citizens have equal rights to bring their religious beliefs into the public 
square and government’s only role is to deal even-handedly between them.’49 
This ‘soft secular government’, as Mortensen calls it, occurs most frequently in 
the case of hospitals, welfare and private schooling.50 
While in principle, a soft approach to religion and law is not problematic, 
Mortensen argues that what is troubling is the fact that the Australian courts have 
effectively cancelled themselves out of any ability to police the ‘arrangements, 
which government and religious groups were prepared to strike themselves, to 
ensure that government remained impartial in its dealings with different religious 
and non-religious groups.’51 Mortensen’s conclusion is that the current state of 
judicial analysis52 of s 116 of the Australian Constitution ensures that a future 
‘wall of separation’ between Church and state has poor prospects in Australia.53 
This means that ‘a harder form of secular government is unlikely ever to be 
accepted … [because] the courts show no inclination to accept “separation” as 
 
 44 Garth Blake, ‘Child Protection and the Anglican Church of Australia’ in Christine Parker and 
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 45 Ibid. 
 46 Reid Mortensen, ‘Judicial (In)Activism in Australia’s Secular Commonwealth’ in Christine 
Parker and Gordon Preece (eds), Theology and Law: Partners or Protagonists? (2005) 52. 
 47 Nicky Jones, ‘The State of Secularism: The New Law and the Affair of the Islamic Headscarf in 
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 48 Frank Brennan, ‘Church-State Concerns about Same Sex Marriage and the Failure to Accord 
Same Sex Couples Their Due’ in Christine Parker and Gordon Preece (eds), Theology and Law: 
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the appropriate organising principle for secular governance in Australia.’54 And 
this in turn means that ‘in the deepening political debate about the role of 
religion in Australian public life, any appeal to “separation” as a tradition of the 
Australian polis itself lacks persuasive power.’55 Given that its absence has not 
proven troublesome over the first 100 plus years of Australian federation, 
Mortensen might have presented evidence as to why such a ‘wall of separation’ 
may be necessary today. Absent such evidence, this essay seems equally suppor-
tive of the soft secular status quo. 
Brennan’s essay, which asks whether ‘the civil institution of marriage … 
[should] be expanded to include a same sex union in which two persons volun-
tarily commit themselves exclusively to each other for life’,56 seems to confirm 
Mortensen’s conclusion that in Australia, separation may be more of the soft than 
the hard variety. Having set out a number of qualifying limitations, Brennan 
reviews the 2004 Senate debate on the proposed amendment to the Marriage Act 
1961 (Cth) to ensure that ‘marriage’ meant ‘the union of a man and a woman to 
the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.’57 The essay con-
cludes that in contemporary Australia, a same-sex union should not be called 
‘marriage’ because that term has a popular and religious meaning which reflects 
people’s lived experience in families headed by a mother and a father. For 
Brennan, ‘[t]he legal definition of marriage should continue to follow the 
contours of that meaning and experience.’58 
Given the polemical nature of this debate, one wishes that Brennan had pre-
sented evidence substantiating the claim that the popular and religious meanings 
of marriage in Australia reflect a lived experience. Unfortunately, other than the 
facts as found in various Canadian and American appellate court decisions, there 
is no mention of sociological or other studies that would support this claim. 
Moreover, Brennan does not provide any evidence as to what the ‘religious 
meaning’ of marriage might be. True it may be that most mainstream Christian 
traditions support the legal definition of marriage now found in the Marriage Act 
1961 (Cth), but that is more by way of assertion than proof of the link between 
the religious meaning of marriage and the lived experience of Australians. 
From here, Brennan notes that advocates of such change often follow a ‘twin 
track’ strategy of agitating for change both in legislatures and courts.59 Yet, the 
essay fails to address the relationship between these two strategies or how they 
might influence one another. Rather, the remainder of the essay is a critique of 
the positions taken by final appellate courts in Australia,60 Canada61 and the 
United States.62 Yet even here, Brennan’s argument seems sketchy — boldly 
asserting that ‘[s]uch a fundamental change to a social institution should be made 
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by the citizens or their elected legislators rather than by unelected judges’,63 he 
does little to tap into the democratic underpinnings of this claim, with its long 
and rich pedigree which has champions on both sides of the ideological divide in 
the American constitutional literature.64 
V  THEOLOGY AND LAW  
While an engagement, or theology and law approach might offer the best 
means of testing the question posed in the subtitle of Law and Theology, Preece 
writes that synthesis was beyond ‘space limitations’65 and probably beyond the 
‘current abilities of each group to engage fruitfully with each other’s deep 
structures and highly technical language’.66 Thus, integration is ‘still in its 
methodological infancy, despite many great theologians such as Tertullian and 
Calvin being lawyers by training.’67 The rejection of these two approaches is 
disappointing, for very useful research in recent years has shown how beneficial 
engagement might be. To take but three such examples: Berman propounds what 
has been called an integrative jurisprudence;68 Robert E Rodes Jr demonstrates 
how liberation theology69 may be implemented in domestic law;70 and Singer 
argues that the legal-political understanding of private property may benefit from 
insights gained from theology, which in turn leads to practical benefits for 
Western legal systems.71 Given this substantial body of American literature, it 
would have been valuable if Theology and Law had included some contributions 
making use of synthesis and integration. Still, Preece is mostly correct in saying 
that these techniques require a great deal of development and so, for that reason 
alone, there probably was insufficient space for a full development of theoretical 
synthesis or integration. 
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Two essays in the collection, however, utilise Preece’s fifth category, to ask 
questions about the character formation of professionals in the light of theologi-
cal and experiential narratives which sustain Christian and ethical character, and 
so use theology and law methodology. Adrian Evans,72 Associate Professor of 
Law at Monash University and Christine Parker,73 ARC Research Fellow at 
Melbourne Law School, both attempt to identify ways in which Christian ethical 
values can direct, guide and shape the work of practising lawyers. And while 
both take what might be called a limited engagement approach — in the sense 
that they seek to integrate Christian ethical and moral stances not with legal 
theory, but with the practice of law — they nonetheless assert the importance of 
understanding underlying theological-moral stances in the context of legal 
practice. As such, both make novel and valuable contributions to the Australian 
literature on legal professional ethics. 
Adrian Evans argues for introducing law students to 
the need for lawyers’ re-connection to values-based decision making, if only 
because lawyers as lawyers are incredibly powerful mediators of justice and 
injustice and none can practice successfully over the long term without some 
awareness of these ‘value roots’.74  
Doing so means it is necessary to talk with law students about the ‘big picture’ 
issues of life, death, god(s) and community. The challenge is to find a way to 
achieve this within the traditional setting of legal education — a secular, 
materialistic environment which pretends to be value-neutral but is ultimately 
driven by success and hence conducive to the inculcation of scepticism about 
underlying spiritual values.75 Evans argues that because ‘the rest of the planet 
might be far more faith-conscious than Australia’,76 the way to engage law 
students in a dialogue about these big picture issues is through the surrogate 
concept of ‘values’, a modern euphemism for faith-related reflection and a 
crucial bridge to personal growth, whatever the sense of spiritual roots.77 Brave 
talk indeed for an Australian legal academic! 
In legal practice, values manifest themselves and are represented by legal 
ethics. Evans’ contention is that the quality of ethics, the ‘language of values for 
lawyers’,78 has suffered because lawyers’ underlying values are so little ac-
knowledged or understood. To study this, Evans conducted an empirical study 
designed to understand what values are important in determining lawyers’ 
attitudes.79 The study examined issues of conflicting loyalties within a context of 
self-interest and lawyers’ perceived obligations to various stakeholders80 such as 
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those that might arise in pro bono work, reporting a client’s husband for child 
abuse, and rounding-up hours on a bill.81 The results of the study are clearly of 
use to those who teach and research in the area of legal professional ethics.82 For 
our purposes, the engagement with theology and law makes this essay a valuable 
contribution to gaining an understanding of the ways in which Christian moral 
ethics can play a role in the practice of law and in encouraging lawyers to act 
ethically. 
In ‘Christian Ethics in Legal Practice: Connecting Faith and Practice’,83 Parker 
presents the results of a series of workshops prepared for lawyers to reflect on 
the creative tension between faith and legal practice. The workshops encouraged 
lawyers to forge their own connections between faith and practice, as well as 
providing a gospel perspective on the issues that Christian lawyers are likely to 
face over the course of their careers.84 Parker writes that 
Christian lawyers face the challenge of, not only being faithful at a personal 
and individual level (eg working with integrity and honesty), but also engaging 
with ‘structural’ tensions between the kingdom of God and aspects of our pro-
fessional lives …85 
This challenge occurs in the context of the broader tension between the ‘way 
things are done’ in the legal profession and the way things are ordered in the 
kingdom of God.86 Based on the workshops, Parker found that different people 
handle these tensions and connections in different ways at different times in their 
lives: some keep the secular and Christian spheres mostly separate and focus 
mostly on the individual level of faith and work, others try to lead an exemplary 
ethical life, others become ‘social reformers’, while still others use legal practice 
as a Christian ministry.87 
Four themes emerged from the workshops. First, the pursuit of justice creates 
ongoing creative tension for the Christian lawyer, stemming from the difference 
in meaning between secular and Christian justice. In the case of the former, 
justice involves legal due process and a lawyer playing within the rules of the 
game, while for the latter, true righteousness or justice comes through God’s 
grace and mercy. For the Christian, social justice is about the proper structuring 
of relationships between God and people and among human beings, involving 
the links of obligation, responsibility and care that bind people together in a 
covenant of love.88 The second theme involves Christian lawyers using their 
legal skills and insights to assist their church to express the distinctive vision of 
justice framed by the gospel — this is known as the ‘kingdom approach to 
justice’.89 The third theme, proclaiming the gospel in words and actions, can be 
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accomplished in many different ways: at one extreme, one may simply ensure 
that one acts honestly and conscientiously, while at the other, one may work 
solely for the poor and oppressed or take opportunities in conversations with 
colleagues or clients to discuss issues of faith.90 The final theme — avoiding 
idolatry — explains attempts to avoid having all of one’s time, energy and desire 
sucked into work and the practice of law. Parker writes that ‘[w]ork can be an 
idol’ — one of the worst kind: 
Many lawyers are unsatisfied with the long hours they have to work in large 
law firms, unrealistic time-based billing targets they must meet, lack of control 
over worklife and lack of meaningful work. Law firm culture can include laud-
ing professional competence (sometimes to the exclusion of other aspects of 
life), ambition driven by money, elitism, prestige, lack of nurture of junior law-
yers, breakdown of firm loyalties (even partners can be sacked for lack of per-
formance), heavy drinking and competition to rack up billable hours. Many 
lawyers leave the profession while they are still young.91 
Work becomes an idol when it, not God, becomes the thing that gives one’s life 
meaning and ‘[i]t is obvious that this is very much at odds with the kind of 
community and behaviour to which Christians are called.’92 As with Evans’ 
contribution, Parker’s essay is equally valuable as an exploration of the way in 
which Christian theology plays a role in the formation of values for practising 
Christian lawyers. 
A theologian, not a lawyer, wrote the only contribution offering a deeper 
engagement with theology and law. In ‘Satisfying Justice: Victims, Justice and 
the Grain of the Universe’,93 Christopher D Marshall addresses the social 
responsibility imposed on people by the Scriptures to care for the victims of 
injustice. According to Marshall, this responsibility involves not merely feeling, 
but doing care for the needy. Both law and Christianity have much to learn: the 
former still finds it difficult to respond appropriately to the plight of victims, 
while the latter has much to learn about satisfying justice.94 Having offered some 
reflections on the nature of victimisation and the ways in which a religious 
community might respond to victims,95 Marshall turns to consider restorative 
justice — a legal framework which offers a ‘third way’ between the dominant 
retributive and rehabilitative models of penal philosophy.96 
While this novel paradigm involves a distinctive process that gives expression 
to, and prioritises, a set of values, Marshall argues that if it is to work as a 
legitimate third way, it must be anchored in a ‘community of value’ which 
prioritises ‘mutual care and accountability, honesty and compassion, confession 
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and forgiveness and peacemaking.’97 This model brings satisfaction to victims 
and offenders, as well as meeting the needs of wider society — and it may 
achieve all of this in a spiritual way.98 From a theological perspective, this model 
is grounded in something beyond human devising — according to Christian 
theology, it has an objective, metaphysical basis. This may be difficult for those 
who hold to secular humanism to accept, but ‘for those who believe that the 
Christian story is objectively true, such a conclusion is inescapable.’99 Marshall 
concludes that according to the Christian world view, ‘restoring love is the 
ground of the universe.’100 
Marshall argues that this conclusion has enormous implications: as a model, 
restorative justice works because it accords with the way God made people and 
God’s plan for the universe.101 And to those (nurtured in a postmodern world on 
a steady diet of relativism) who call this attempt to find a metaphysical ground-
ing for justice far-fetched, Marshall responds in much the same way that Berman 
or Milsom might — rather than being something new and outrageous, a model of 
justice grounded in theology is historically paradigmatic. Contemporary post-
modern scepticism about such a grounding is unique in the history of human 
thought. In fact, while the legal academy today may reject such a claim, Marshall 
argues that the whole sweep of human history shows that the ‘just deserts’ 
concept of justice is grounded in the natural law tradition, which itself has 
origins in ‘Judeo-Christian values, virtues and beliefs about the nature of 
ultimate reality.’102 This 
should not be confused for fuzzy sentiments or romantic ideals. They are costly 
commitments, fashioned in the furnace of human suffering and attested in full 
face of the ambiguities and contradictions of human life and of the sheer tenac-
ity of evil. They are also the values and commitments that give human life its 
meaning and beauty, that put us in touch with the divine, and that inspire us to 
seek a better world, a world in which we do justice with a restoring face.103 
Marshall’s contribution is therefore both novel — it offers a deeper engagement 
with law and theology — and valuable as it argues for a reassertion of Christian 
theology and its understanding of justice as having played, and still being 
capable of playing, a paramount role in the development and understanding of 
justice in contemporary Western law and society. As Berman has argued in the 
American context, this is a necessary, although perhaps not always welcome 
correction to our understanding of the historical antecedents of our legal tradition 
and the contemporary operation of our legal system.104 
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VI  CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
Having presented a means of defining and distinguishing theology and relig-
ion, this review essay argues that from that distinction, two methodological 
approaches flow for use in considering the relationship of those disciplines to 
law: theology and law, or law and religion. A majority of the essays in Theology 
and Law take the latter approach. Given that this approach is relatively 
well-established in the Australian legal academy, this part of the volume, while 
making a valuable contribution to the existing literature, is not especially unique. 
The real importance of Theology and Law lies in the essays taking a theology 
and law approach. They demonstrate that, rather than being partners or protago-
nists, theology and law are both protagonist and partner to each other — at one 
moment protagonists, continually urging and prodding the other to restructure, 
develop and advance, while at the next, and as a result of their protagonism, 
partners in the common pursuit of morality and justice. Theology and law as a 
methodology is comparatively novel in the Australian legal academy. For that 
reason alone, the essays taking such an approach make a valuable and unique 
contribution to the existing literature. 
As a whole though, whatever the methodology used, Theology and Law makes 
a substantial contribution simply by opening a sustained and focused dialogue 
between religion — which includes theology — and law. The contributors each 
demonstrate that there are both theoretical and practical benefits that flow from 
the paradoxical relationship between religion and law — benefits that help us 
better understand the nature of justice and how to promote it in the society in 
which we live. By going to the core of the interaction between law and theology, 
the essays by Marshall, Evans and Parker, for example, assert the Christian 
heritage of the Western legal tradition. 
As Berman and others have shown, the Western legal tradition, far from being 
secular in its origins, owes much to Christian theology and the system of canon 
law that grew out of that theology.105 True, throughout its history, Western law 
has used Christianity in ways that have produced profoundly negative outcomes 
for individuals and groups. But that does not vitiate the very important relation-
ship that exists between theology and law. And it is this relationship that is not 
only under-studied and forgotten in the Australian legal academy, but also, much 
more alarmingly, sometimes denied. By failing to study this relationship, by 
forgetting it, by denying it, we blind ourselves to not only ‘the multiformity of 
the legal tradition … [but also] the multiformity of history itself.’106 Although 
addressing the American experience, Berman might just as easily have been 
writing about the contemporary Australian legal academy when he observed that 
in such an environment: 
It is easier … to complain about the compartmentalization of knowledge than to 
do something constructive to overcome it. Any effort to reintegrate past times is 
likely to be understood and judged in terms of the prevailing categories and 
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concepts. … Yet without a reintegration of the past there is no way either to re-
trace our steps or to find guidelines for the future.107 
The dialogue between religion (and especially theology) and law is a necessary 
one — without it, we overlook, forget, deny and reject the origins of our con-
temporary law and legal tradition. And we do so at our peril, if for no other 
reason than to avoid the mistakes of the past while recognising that theology in 
the moral arena may still have much of value to say about, and to, our contempo-
rary world. Theology and Law marks an opening to a much-needed Australian 
dialogue between law and theology, and a step towards a better understanding of 
the influence — past and future, negative and positive — of theology in law. 
For us, the task is now to build on the start made in this collection. There will 
be sceptics, but for those of us involved in this work, we can only answer that we 
do it because we believe that theology had, has, and will have, something to say 
about the way in which law structures the world in which we live, just as any 
other discipline, such as politics, economics or sociology does. In other words, 
the study of the relationship between theology and law is inherently valuable. 
Islamic legal scholar and UCLA law Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl puts this 
best in a response to being asked about studying the Qur’ān: 
I do believe in the authenticity of the Qur’ān as God’s uncorrupted and immu-
table Word. Furthermore, I do believe that the Qur’ān is worth exploring, 
studying and, in one sense or another, following. I do not hold this belief as a 
social scientist who notes that the Qur’ān deserves to be studied because of the 
sociological fact that most Muslims hold it in high regard. The sociological re-
ality is irrelevant for my purposes. I study the Qur’ān as a jurist who believes in 
the object of his study, very much akin to a Rabbi studying the Talmud or an 
American constitutional scholar analyzing the American Constitution.108 
To be more blunt, in Australian legal discourse, the theological voice behind our 
legal tradition has been silenced for too long. Theology and Law breaks the 
silence. 
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